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Abstract:  Federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the Canadian personal income tax schedule, changing 
the marginal tax rates for many individuals. Using methods similar to those applied by Auten and 
Carroll (1999) in the study of the effects of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act, we estimate the 
responsiveness of  income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in Canada. However we find 
evidence of a much higher response in self-employment income, in the labour income of seniors and 
from those with high incomes.   
 
JEL Code:  H24, Personal income and other nonbusiness taxes and subsidies 
 
Key Words:  Marginal tax rate effects on taxable income, tax avoidance  
 
Corresponding author: Michael R. Veall, 
        Department of Economics and SEDAP, 
        McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, L8S 4M4. 
        phone: 1-905-525-9140 x23829 
        FAX: 1-905-521-8232 
        email: veall@mcmaster.ca     1
1. Introduction 
Canada undertook a major personal income tax reform in 1988.  While changes in 
marginal tax rates were not as substantial as they were in either of the United States tax reforms of 
1981or 1986, it nonetheless seems remiss that the effects have not been widely studied. This is in sharp 
contrast to the literature on U.S. tax reform: see for example the survey of Auerbach and Slemrod 
(1997) and the book edited by Slemrod (1990). Our goal is to determine what can be learned from the 
Canadian experience, in particular with respect to estimation of the response of taxable income to 
changes in tax rates. 
The responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates (henceforward, the “tax-
price elasticity”) has been a particular focus of the U.S. research. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), 
Slemrod (1998), Saez (1999) and Auten and Carroll (1999, henceforward AC) either are surveys or 
include brief surveys and provide many other references. The size of this elasticity helps determine the 
social marginal cost per dollar revenue raised by the personal income tax system and hence is important 
in determining both the optimal tax mix and the optimal size of the public sector.  The potential 
response in household taxable income to changes in personal income tax rates includes the standard 
focus of introductory economics classes such as changes in labor supply and saving behavior. However 
as particularly emphasized by Slemrod (1998), a number of other types of responses are likely 
important. Some of these are described in everyday parlance as “tax planning” and include changes in 
the timing of income realization as well as tax avoidance by such measures as changing the form of 
compensation or the type of assets held. Responses may also include tax evasion as well as a variety of 
behavioral changes that may change the timing and nature of tax deductions and tax credits. 
The nature of Canadian tax reform is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data: 
the availability of a very large taxfiler data set for Canada is one of the motivations for this research.    2
The empirical model is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides the empirical results. To anticipate 
this section, using a method and specification very similar to that used by AC for the United States, we 
estimate that the tax-price elasticity is relatively small in Canada. However, when we focus on self-
employment income, the labour income of seniors or on individuals with high incomes, it appears as if 
the response to taxes may be larger. Naturally any differences between results for Canada and results 
for other countries do not necessarily imply that the labor supply or saving behavior of Canadians is 
different: the differences could be as a result of differences in personal income tax systems. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Tax Reform in Canada 
 
The Canadian personal income tax system is individually based in the sense that there is no 
such thing as a joint return by spouses: all those with significant income must file singly. However, in 
some cases individuals with low income spouses can claim a deduction for that spouse, and the spouse 
will not file. Both the federal government and each province and territory have a personal income tax; 
for every province and territory except Quebec, the provincial/territorial basic personal income tax is a 
given percentage of the federal tax, although this percentage varies by province and over time. (For 
example basic provincial personal income tax as a percentage of basic federal tax in 1986 ranged from a 
low of 43.5% in Alberta to a high of 60% in Newfoundland, with a rate of 50% in the largest province, 
Ontario. By 1989 these rates were 46.5%, 61% and 52% respectively.) As a rough approximation, 
therefore, total marginal tax rates are about 50% greater than federal marginal tax rates. In every 
province and territory besides Quebec, filing for both federal and provincial personal income tax is done 
at the same time using the same package of forms. Both the federal and provincial tax systems, 
however, have their own individual surtaxes, reliefs and credits.  In Quebec, provincial income tax is   3
filed separately from federal income tax and even basic provincial income tax is not a direct function of 
federal income tax.  
While changes in Canadian personal income tax provisions are frequent both at the federal 
and provincial level, the tax reform of 1988 was unusually substantial. There were two main types of 
changes. First, as shown in Table 1, the number of tax brackets changed from eleven to four, changing 
the marginal federal tax rates for some individuals by reasonably large amounts (especially recalling 
that, because of the dependence of most provincial tax rates on federal tax rates, marginal total tax rates 
changed by about 50% more). Unlike the 1986 United States tax reform, there were no comparable 
changes to corporation income tax. Second, the definition of taxable income was changed as a number 
of exemptions and deductions that were previously subtracted in the calculation of taxable income were 
either eliminated or more commonly converted to nonrefundable tax credits. Each tax deduction and 
exemption had saved a qualifying taxpayer with a high marginal tax rate more dollars than a qualifying 
taxpayer with a low marginal tax rate but the new tax credits represented approximately the same 
absolute dollar tax saving to most taxpayers. As well, the fraction of capital gains and losses included in 
income tax was changed from one-half to two-thirds. These changes mean that the columns of Table 1 
are not comparable and there is no one-to-one correspondence between income level and changes in 
either marginal tax rates or taxes paid. However, the basic patterns over the years 1986 to 1989 are 
illustrated in the Appendix for two very uncomplicated taxfilers, a single taxpayer with only standard 
deductions/exemptions and a similar childless taxpayer with a spouse who earns no income.  
Such calculations make two points clear. First, because of the phasing in and out of special 
tax reliefs in Ontario and other provinces, marginal tax rates for those with low incomes change 
dramatically over relatively small ranges of income.  Because of this and also because social assistance 
may create earning disincentives unrelated to the personal income tax, we will exclude low income   4
taxpayers from this analysis.  Second, unlike the U.S. reforms where marginal personal income tax rates 
fell at virtually all income levels (although by varying amounts), in Canada marginal tax rates tended to 
fall for those at low, moderately low and high incomes. For those with middle incomes the pattern was 
more mixed, with some increases and some reductions. 
Our analysis will be over the period 1986 to 1989. The starting year was chosen to 
minimize anticipatory effects, given the 1988 tax reform was announced in 1987. The end year was 
chosen because 1990 was the beginning of a serious and persistent recession in Canada and there were 
also major tax changes in 1991 (especially involving tax-deferred saving as well as the introduction of a 
value added tax). Using the 1989 endpoint avoids these problems, although it is likely that our analysis 
does not capture all the long-run effects of the reform. 
3. The Data 
 
The Canadian experience may be particularly useful to study because the available data set 
is large. The Small Area and Administrative Data Division of Statistics Canada maintains the 
Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD), a panel data file of information as provided by taxfilers 
on their personal income tax returns. Both personal and family income and taxation information is kept 
for each individual in the panel. The panel started with the 1982 tax year and is updated each year. Each 
year’s sample is representative of the set of all taxfilers plus those who did not file but are included on 
the return of a spouse who did file. Once selected, taxfilers appear in the database every subsequent 
year that they appear on a tax return. Because the LAD is a 10% sample and currently about 20 million 
Canadians file a personal income tax return, the resulting sample is substantial.   
As mentioned our target period will be 1986 to 1989. We include only individuals who 
filed in both years, without changing province of residence or marital status. We exclude residents of 
Quebec, because the Quebec provincial income tax system is so different, but we include residents of all   5
other provinces and territories. As mentioned we also exclude low income individuals who may be 
subject to high marginal tax rates over short ranges of the income schedule: specifically we exclude 
anyone who did not pay at least $625 basic federal tax in 1986 or its rough real equivalent of $700 in 
1989. We consider two age groups, those who were always between 25 and 64 years of age during this 
period and those who were always over 64 years of age during this period.
1 
4. The Empirical Model 
 
Changes in the marginal tax rate may influence reported taxpayer income in many ways 
(see e.g. Feldstein (1995) or Slemrod (1998). Following AC we try to estimate the effect through a 
model that includes among its independent variables the log of (one minus the marginal tax rate 
(MTR)), a variable henceforward called the log of the “tax price”: 
Yit = mi + gt + b log (1-MTRt)  + X'iat  +  eit                     (1) 
 
where Yit will be a measure for individual i  at time t of income or some other variable that may be a 
function of changes in tax rates, mi  is the fixed effect for individual i and gt is a pure time effect. X'i is a 
row vector of observations on individual i on variables that do not vary over time but may have a time-
varying effect on Yit (an effect summarized by at) and eit  is a random error.  
 
Again following the approach of AC we take the 1989 less 1986 first difference to obtain: 
 
           DYit = Dgt + b Dlog (1-MTRt) + X'iDat  + Deit                 (2)              
 
where D denotes the first difference.  
 
Following AC our X'i includes the log of initial income, the log of initial capital income, 
the initial age and the initial age-squared, the initial number of children and marital status (which 
                                                 
1 Auten and Carroll (1999) also exclude those who change marital status as well as a number of low  income 
individuals. They also exclude those who are not always over age 24 but put the upper age limit on their sample at 
59 rather than the 64 we use for our younger sample. They do not exclude those who changed state of residence as 
we exclude those who changed province of residence.   6
remains unchanged), where in our case “initial” means 1986. AC argue that the initial income variable 
allows for reversion-to-the-mean effects, that the initial capital income variable is a proxy for financial 
wealth  (which may affect a taxpayer’s ability to adjust asset holdings and labor market arrangements as 
a response to changes in tax rates), and that age, age-squared, number of children and marital status 
variables allow for life cycle and household effects. We use a self-employment dummy to replace AC’s 
“entrepreneurship” dummy and we include provincial and territorial dummies for Canada while AC 
used regional dummies for the United States. AC also include a “Children away from home” dummy 
and (in some sets of estimates) occupational dummies. We cannot estimate these dummy variables 
accurately and do not include them. We note that in AC, the inclusion of occupational dummies made 
little difference to the coefficients of other variables. 
Turning to the variables in somewhat more detail, Yit is a gross income variable defined as 
income reported for taxation purposes adjusted to (i) reflect actual dividend income rather than an 
adjusted dividend income that is used for tax purposes (ii) remove capital gains (iii) include refundable 
tax credits and (iv) include nontaxable transfers such as workers’ compensation and social assistance 
income. Recall the 1986 value of this variable is also on the right-hand side as part of Xi.  In other 
regressions we use different dependent variables to try to focus on different components of income. 
Capital income is defined as investment plus dividend income. Regular employment 
income is from employment that is not self-employment. For these and other variables that can equal 
zero in the sample, $1 is added to all values so that logarithms may be taken. Most of the other 
variables are self-explanatory except for the self-employment dummy, which equals one if 1986 self-
employment income exceeds $500 and is zero otherwise. Self-employment income includes net 
business, commission, farming, fishing, partnership and professional income. The means and standard 
deviations of all variables (some of which will be discussed in Section V) are defined in Table 2.   7
 
We must calculate a marginal tax rate variable because it is not included in the LAD set. It 
is defined as the additional provincial and federal personal income tax that would be paid on one dollar 
of labor income including all surtaxes and reliefs. Our measure is approximate only because it does not 
include possible additional payments on unemployment insurance, Canada Pension Plan (the public 
pension program) or any secondary effects through the medical expense deduction or the charitable 
contribution deduction/credit (both of which may in some cases be limited by taxable income) or 
foreign taxes paid. 
5. Results 
 
A difficulty with estimating equation (2) is the endogeneity of the marginal tax rate 
variable. The marginal tax rate can change both because of the legislation and because of changes in 
taxable income that push taxpayers into lower or higher tax brackets. Hence changes in the marginal tax 
rate variable may be correlated with the disturbances in equation (2). If ordinary least squares estimates 
were employed, the estimates would be inconsistent. Hence again following AC, we employ an 
instrumental variables technique, treating the actual marginal tax rate variable (the log of the tax-price) 
as endogenous and using as an instrument the log of the tax-price calculated with the “exogenous” 
marginal tax rate (EMTR), the marginal tax rate that would have been applicable had the taxpayer’s 
real income not changed.  The results of this procedure are given in the first column of Table 3. While 
the estimated coefficients of the variables are not always numerically close to those of AC for the 
United States, the signs are identical.  The key coefficient,  that of the log of the tax price, is about .25, 
much smaller than the AC preferred estimate of approximately .6.
2 This in turn is smaller than other 
                                                 
2 As noted, AC limit their sample to individuals age 25 to 55 but we use age 25 to 61. As a check, we redid the 
estimates restricting the sample only to those 25 to 55 in 1986 and obtained results for all coefficients very close 
numerically to those above, with the coefficient of the log of the tax price 0.23.  We also wondered whether the 
self-employment dummy variable adequately captured variations in self-employment activity across individuals.   8
estimates based on periods of U.S. tax reform such as an estimate of approximately .8 due Navratil 
(1995) and the still higher values of from 1 to about 3 estimated by Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein 
(1995). Of course as Slemrod (1998) emphasizes, there is no necessary inconsistency between our 
estimates for Canada and the higher values estimated for the United States: different tax systems have 
different tax price elasticities. 
We now consider different dependent variables. First we consider taxable income.  
However because some tax deductions changed to tax credits during this period, 1986 taxable income 
is adjusted so that it is on the same basis as 1989 taxable income, i.e. those 1986 deductions that would 
not have applied in 1989 (because they had been converted to tax credits) are added back into 1986 
taxable income. We call the result taxable income adjusted for credits and it can be seen that the results 
are very close to those based on gross income with the tax-price elasticity still smaller. As the gross 
income definition does not include capital gains but the taxable income definition does, the closeness of 
these results suggests that the change in capital gains treatment between 1986 and 1989 is not driving 
these results.    
Another possible dependent variable is work income defined as regular employment (that 
is employment that is not self-employment) income plus self-employment income.  It can be seen that it 
appears to have been much more responsive to the change in tax rates than the other income definitions, 
with an estimated tax-price elasticity of .9.  When the dependent variable is broken up into its 
components, the estimated tax rate sensitivity of regular employment income is low while the estimated 
tax-price elasticity of self-employment income exceeds one. As a sensitivity check, we respecified the 
work income, regular employment income and self-employment income equations so each would have 
                                                                                                                                                       
Accordingly we added the 1986 log of self-employment income to the regression and found its coefficient to be 
small, positive and significantly different from zero, but that no other estimated coefficient changed substantially 
and the estimated tax price elasticity is 0.22.   9
the log of 1986 regular employment income and the log of 1986 self-employment income as right hand 
side variables (with the log of 1986 work income deleted from the work income equation). The key 
results from this were that the coefficients of the log of regular employment income and self-
employment income were almost identical in the work income equation, the estimated tax-price 
elasticity for regular employment income was unchanged, but the estimated tax-price elasticity for self-
employment income fell to just over .7. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the results are consistent with 
the view that the tax-price responsiveness of self-employment income is significantly greater than that 
of regular employment income. This result seems natural given that there is much more flexibility with 
self-employment income to evade taxes or to pursue tax planning strategies that change the timing or 
type of income received. 
In Table 4, we repeat the previous analysis for the senior population, that is for all those 
over age 64 in 1986.  For the first two columns it can be seen that the results are very comparable to 
those of Table 3. But from the third column it can be seen that the tax-price elasticity estimate for work 
income is very high. For the senior population, where presumably the option of retiring or reducing 
labor hours substantially is a frequently considered option, the estimates from our approach suggest that 
regular employment income is more sensitive to the tax price than is self-employment income.
3 
In an earlier “difference-in-difference” approach to tax rate responsiveness in Canada, 
Sillamaa (1998) found evidence of different responses to the tax reform change by income level. Hence 
in Table 5, we restrict our sample only to those with high income, defined as gross income in excess of 
$75,000 in 1986. Not all these individuals were in the top bracket in 1986 (if so there would have been 
no variation in our instrument and the estimation would not have succeeded) but most such individuals 
                                                 
3 Here when we pursued the robustness checks involving adding the log of 1986 self-employment income or  the 
log of 1986 regular employment income  or both to various equations as described above and in footnote 2, there 
was almost no numerical change in any of the coefficient estimates.   10
are in the top two 1986 brackets. Hence the estimation essentially compares the behavior of the top 
bracket and “almost-top-bracket” taxpayers. (This is in a limited sense in the spirit of Eissa (1995) 
where the difference-in-difference approach is applied to very high household income married women 
taxpayers with a control group of high household income married women taxpayers. Feldstein (1995) 
also uses this approach although he also considers a moderate income group who experiences 
substantial marginal tax rate reductions.) The first column estimates come from a sample of all high 
income taxpayers age 25 to 61 in 1986, the second column comes from a sample of all high income 
taxpayers age 65+ in 1986 and the third column uses only married women, age 25 to 61 in 1986
4. Gross 
income tax-price elasticity estimates are about 1.3, 1.9 and .9 respectively. Navratil (1995) finds 
evidence that tax-price responses are higher for high income individuals for both episodes of United 
States tax reform he studies. 
These estimates are much higher than the comparable estimates in Tables 3 and 4. Lindsey 
(1985) offers the approximation that the tax rate that maximizes revenue is the reciprocal of one plus 
the tax-price elasticity. Using that approximation, these estimates suggest that for a population of these 
higher income individuals, revenue would be maximized by a marginal tax rate of about 45% for the 
working age population, which is slightly less than the top marginal rate at the time. For seniors, the 
maximum-revenue marginal rate is estimated to be about 35% and for married women, just over 50%. 
As Lindsey, AC and Feldstein (1999) all point out, these approximations depend on the assumption that 
the tax system is proportional; with a progressive tax system the revenue-maximizing tax rate is lower. 
However these results must be treated with caution. First, they are based on much smaller 
sample sizes than those in Tables 3 and 4 and indeed the tax-price elasticity estimate for married women 
is barely significant at the 5 per cent level.  Second, the earlier results of overall sensitivity are being 
                                                 
4 This is not comparable to Eissa (1995) because these women earn this income individually. (As mentioned,   11
driven by the response of high income individuals even though some lower income individuals received 
marginal tax rate reductions as well. Hence when we lowered the cutoff from $75,000 first to $60,000 
and then to $50,000, the tax-price elasticity estimates corresponding to the first column fell to 0.99 and 
then to 0.80. So while our results are consistent with a substantial tax-price sensitivity by high income 
individuals (who initially had the highest marginal tax rate), they are also consistent with any other 
factor that led to a particular increase in gross incomes for those in the highest bracket. Third, as 
Slemrod (1996, 1998) emphasizes, high income individuals may have particular access to various sorts 
of mechanisms for changing the form in which income is taken (e.g. fringe benefits, stock plans) or 
changing the timing of income receipt.
5 Hence it is possible the estimation is picking up at least in some 










We have estimated the response of gross income to a significant change in marginal tax 
rates that occurred in Canada in 1988 using a large sample of Canadian taxfilers. Using specifications 
and estimation strategies broadly comparable to those of Auten and Carroll (1999) for the United 
States, our estimates for Canada suggest a tax-price elasticity for working-age individuals of about .25 
or less than half the Auten and Carroll estimate and less than one-quarter of the lower bound Feldstein 
estimate. As has been emphasized by Slemrod (1998), there is no reason that these estimates need be 
                                                                                                                                                       
Canadian personal income tax filing is individual and never joint.) 
5 Goolsbee (1997) finds evidence that high-income U.S. executives do shift income intertemporally in this manner 
but that most of the effects do not persist beyond the year the tax changes take effect.  Veall (2000) finds no 
evidence that Canadian tax reform induced shifts in tax deferred saving behavior.   12
similar even if individuals in the two countries exhibit identical behavioral responses, because the tax 
systems in the two countries are different. When we divide the income into components, we find some 
evidence that reported self-employment income is more sensitive to the tax-price, as might be expected 
given that self-employment allows more opportunities for tax evasion and for tax avoidance or 
intertemporal tax shifting. When we restrict our attention to seniors, the gross income tax-price 
elasticity estimate does not shift much but there is some evidence that the work income component may 
be more tax sensitive, perhaps because those seniors who remain in the work force have more options 
for changing their labour force hours (including either retiring or postponing retirement). Finally, when 
we restrict our sample to higher income individuals of either working age or age 65 and over, there is 
some evidence of tax-price elasticities of one or greater. 
This last result is among the most interesting and we note that Auten and Carroll obtain 
estimates in this range when they do not control for the overweighting of high income returns in their 
sample.  Feldstein (1999) argues that the lower estimates they obtain when they do control for this 
overweighting might underestimate the effect of a proportional tax change if high-income individuals 
have higher behavioral responses; he further presents a United States calculation where the overall 
revenue effects and the deadweight loss of simulated proportional tax change are dominated by the 
responses of high-income taxpayers. Those with high incomes (as well as the self-employed and seniors 
with labour income) might have more flexibility to change their incomes, although some of this may be 
tax planning or intertemporal shifting rather than changes in investment behavior or labour supply. Yet 
the finding of a concentrated gross-income response among high-income taxpayers highlights a possible 
fragility in our identification of these effects. Trends unrelated to taxation that increased the relative 
incomes of those towards the top of the income distribution (such as skill-biased technological change 
or increasing international openness that provides relative benefits to the skilled and mobile) could   13
contribute to our findings.
6 Hence while our results are consistent with a high response by those with 
high incomes, methods that exploit other tax rate variation would be helpful to confirm or refute these 
estimates. These methods may include those that exploit the variation in tax rates due to tax bracket 
creep (Saez, 1999), other methods that use longer periods of time such as those of Navratil (1995) or 
Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) (although these methods bring their own challenges, such as 
finding a suitable control period for the former or finding some replacement for the education variable 
that the latter use as an instrument, given that education is not observed in our data) or perhaps simply 
exploiting time series/cross section variation in federal and provincial income tax changes. 
In summary, our results based on the Canadian 1988 tax reform suggest a smaller overall 
tax price response in Canada than has been estimated for the United States. However our results are 
consistent with a tax price response by the self-employed and those with high incomes that is much 
larger than the overall response. Because there are other possible explanations especially for this latter 
result, further research that exploits other types of tax rate variation would be useful. 
                                                 
6 Similarly our results for high income seniors could be due to high-income seniors postponing their retirement 
relative to lower-income seniors.   14
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Table 1:  Changes in federal tax brackets due to the tax reform of 1988 
1987 taxable income 
limit (Cdn$) 
 
1987 tax rate (%) 
1988 taxable income 
limit (Cdn$) 
 
1988 tax rate (%) 
1320  6    17 
2639  16    17 
5279  17    17 
7918  18    17 
13,197  19    17 
18,476  20    17 
23,755  23    17 
-  23  27,500  17 
36,952  25  -  26 
-  25  55,000  26 
63,347  30  above  29 
above  34  -  29 
   17
 
 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
  Age 25-61 in 1986  Age 65+ in 1986 
  Mean  s.d.  Mean  s.d. 
Dlog gross taxable income  0.0648  0.3396  -0.0075  0.2998 
Dlog  taxable income adjusted for credits  0.1037   0.3656  0.0405  0.3458 
Dlog work income  -0.1468   1.7205  -0.7413  2.7549 
Dlog regular employment income  -0.1897   2.2036  -0.6536  2.6190 
Dlog self-employment income  0.0565   1.8975  -0.1229  1.4332 
Dlog (1-marginal tax rate)  -0.0129  0.1014  -0.0047  0.1022 
Dlog (1- exogenous marginal tax rate)  -0.0266   0.1284  0.0029  0.1428 
log 1986 gross income   10.2541  0.4894  10.1999  0.5059 
log 1986 taxable income adjusted for credits  10.1146   0.4870  10.0941  0.5181 
log of 1986 work income  9.9087   1.5098  2.1873  3.9911 
log 1986 regular employment income  9.4944   2.4334  1.6294  3.5517 
log 1986 self-employment income  0.6723   2.4565  0.6324  2.3955 
log of 1986 capital income  3.5249   3.4218  8.2557  2.2238 
age in 1986  40  10.0050  72  5.6949 
age in 1986 squared  1700  847.6205  5200  850.8803 
self-employment dummy  0.0677  0.2512  0.0703  0.2557 
number of children  1.2142  1.1887  0.0799  0.3457 
marital status  0.7794  0.4147  0.6240  0.4844 
change in self-employment  0.0066  0.2252  -0.0126  0.1939 
change in number of children  -0.0417  0.8100  .0039  0.3421 
count  475090  46460 
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Table 3: Instrumental Variable Estimates, Population 25-61 in 1986 
Dependent Variable:  Change in income 
  Definition of income used: 
  Gross  Taxable 
(Adjusted for 
Credits) 
Work  Regular 
Employment 
Self-employment 


































































































The endogenous right hand side variable is Dlog (1-MTR) and the instrument is Dlog (1-EMTR), where 
EMTR is the marginal tax rate change that would have occurred if real gross income had remained 
constant. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable Estimates, Population 65+ in 1986 
Dependent Variable:  Change in income 
  Definition of income used: 
  Gross  Taxable 
(Adjusted for 
Credits) 
Work  Regular 
employment 
Self-employment 




































































































 The endogenous right hand side variable is Dlog (1-MTR) and the instrument is Dlog (1-EMTR), where 
EMTR is the marginal tax rate change that would have occurred if real gross income had remained 
constant. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable Estimates, Taxpayers with Gross Income in Excess of $75K 
Dependent Variable:  Change in gross income 
   24 < 1986 age < 62  1986 age > 64   married women, 
 24 < 1986 age < 62 



























































No. of observations  12610  1900  895 
The endogenous right hand side variable is Dlog (1-MTR) and the instrument is Dlog (1-EMTR), 
where EMTR is the marginal tax rate change that would have occurred if real gross income had 
remained constant. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. For the second column, the 
number of selected individuals in the two territories (Yukon and the Northwest Territories) 
became sufficiently small that Statistics Canada removed those individuals from this regression 
calculation to preserve confidentiality and individuals from Yukon have been eliminated from the 
third column for the same reason.   
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Appendix 
 
The following graphs correspond to a taxfiler from Ontario who is in the first case single and in the 
second case is married to a spouse with zero income, otherwise has no dependents, is of age less than 
65, has no pension income, has no disability, is not paying tuition or pursuing further education, has 
medical expenses less than 3% of net income (and also less than 1517 current dollars in 1989), no 
charitable or similar donations and no foreign taxes paid or participation in tax-favoured investments. 
Federal and provincial income taxes are included with all applicable surtaxes and reliefs. (It is the 
phasing out of a provincial relief to low income taxpayers that leads to the spike in each case.) 




























































































Total tax rates, single



























































































Total tax rates, married
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